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Abstract
The agenda I propose for tonight’s talk is both more specific and limited. I intend to look
at the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 177 of the EC Treaty and how it is used by the
legal community in the United Kingdom. In so doing, I shall draw comparisons to the practice in
other major Member States in the Community. My views are of course based on the experience I
have gained in my function as a member of the Court in Luxembourg. I would, therefore, be very
much interested to learn whether they are shared by the legal community of the United Kingdom,
particularly in view of the fact that some of its most eminent members are present tonight.
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INTRODUCTION
Ladies and gentlemen,
It is both a pleasure and an honor to speak to such an illus-
trious gathering here in London tonight. The Court of Justice
of the European Communities, of which I am a member, has
been the subject of great attention over the last couple of
months, and particularly so in the United Kingdom. It will be
sufficient to mention just two contributions to this debate. Ear-'
lier this year, Sir Patrick Neill, QC, the Warden of All Souls Col-
lege, Oxford, submitted a Case Study on the European Court of
Justice in which he expresses a very critical and unflattering view
of the activity of the Court. In August, Mr. Redwood, MP, gave
us his views on Europe in an article published by The Times.' Mr.
Redwood suggested that Member States should have the right to
object to judgments of the Court which were "redefining,
stretching or altering" the law.2 In such cases, the Council
should then uphold the objection or proceed to amend Euro-
pean law in the way recommended by the Court.
I do not propose to contribute to this general debate to-
night. My colleagues at the Court, Judge David Edward and Ad-
vocate General Francis Jacobs, have previously commented on
some of these criticisms. I should also like to refer those of you
who are more particularly interested in this matter to the excel-
lent paper submitted by Lord Howe of Aberavon to the 1995 Bar
Conference on September 30, 1995.
The agenda I propose for tonight's talk is both more spe-
* Mr. Lenz is an Advocate General at the European Court of Justice. Mr. Grill is
one of his Legal Secretaries. This Address was originally given by Mr. Lenz at London
on November 1, 1995. The Authors would like to thank William Robinson for helpful
comments.
1. John Redwood, A Superstate Set up By Stealth, THE TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at 14.
2. Id.
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cific and limited. I intend to look at the preliminary ruling pro-
cedure under Article 177 of the EC Treaty3 and how it is used by
the legal community in the United Kingdom. In so doing, I shall
draw comparisons to the practice in other major Member States
in the Community. My views are of course based on the experi-
ence I have gained in my function as a member of the Court in
Luxembourg. I would, therefore, be very much interested to
learn whether they are shared by the legal community of the
United Kingdom, particularly in view of the fact that some of its
most eminent members are present tonight.
I. THE PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE UNDER
ARTICLE 177
As you are all well aware, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities ("Court of Justice" or "Court") has jurisdic-
tion to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the EC
Treaty and on the validity and interpretation of secondary Com-
munity law. The basis for this jurisdiction is Article 177 of the
EC Treaty. Corresponding provisions are to be found in the
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community4
and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity.5 It should also be mentioned that a Protocol to the Con-
vention of 27 September, 1968 on Jurisdiction and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, the "Brussels
3. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-11)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Off'] Pub. Off. 1987). Article 177 sets forth the details of the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure. Id. art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.. at 689.
4. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EU-
ROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). Article 41 provides the European
Court of Justice with sole jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on issues that arise
under the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"). Id.
art. 41, 261 U.N.T.S. at 171.
5. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987). Article 150 sets forth the pre-
liminary ruling procedure for issues arising under the Treaty Establishing the European
Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty"). Id. art. 150, 298 U.N.T.S. at 215-16.
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Convention," allows or obliges specific courts in the Member
States to refer questions to the Court of Justice in Luxembourg
on the interpretation of the Convention.6 In my speech tonight,
I shall focus on Article 177 of the EC Treaty.
The Court has held that the "acts of the institutions of the
Community," which according to this Article may be the subject-
matter of a preliminary ruling, also include the acts whereby the
Community ratifies international agreements. 7 The Court has
also decided that it has jurisdiction under Article 177 to rule on
the interpretation of the GATT' in so far as the Community is
concerned. 9
Where such questions regarding European Community law
are raised in proceedings before a national court, that court
"may," according to Article 177(2) of the EC Treaty, ask the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.10 The national court
may do so if it "considers that a decision on the question is nec-
essary to enable it to give judgment."" If, however, such a ques-
tion is raised before a court of last instance in a Member State,
that court "shall," according to Article 177(3), refer the matter
to Luxembourg. 12 Such courts are, therefore, under an obliga-
tion to ask for a preliminary judgment of the Court of Justice.
All the other courts enjoy a discretion as to whether they want to
submit the relevant question to the European Court.
The importance of the preliminary ruling procedure can
hardly be overestimated. For obvious reasons, it is paramount
that European law be interpreted in the same way throughout
the whole Community. However, broad areas of the Community
legal order are decentralized. In these areas, the relevant provi-
sions of Community law are applied by the authorities of the
6. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil
and Commercial Matters, J.O. L 299/32 (1972), amended by O.J. L 304/77 (1978),
amended by O.J. L 388/1 (1982), amended by O.J. L 285/1 (1989) [hereinafter Brussels
Convention] (subsequent citations will be to full text, English version, at O.J. L 304/77
(1978), unless cited article has been substantially revised).
7. Haegeman v. Belgium, Case 181/73, [1974] E.C.R. 449, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 515.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1950).
9. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. SPI and SAMI, Joined Cases 267-
269/81, [1983] E.C.R. 801, [1984] 1 C.M.L.R. 354.
10. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 177(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
11. Id.
12. Id. art. 177(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
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Member States. If controversies arise, it therefore falls to the
courts of the Member States to ascertain whether these authori-
ties have interpreted the relevant provisions of Community law
correctly. It is obvious that the courts of, say, Lisbon, Helsinki,
Dublin, and Athens may not necessarily reach the same conclu-
sions with regard to similar controversies. In order to safeguard
the coherence of Community law, it is, therefore, essential that
there is an institution that is in a position to give authoritative
and final rulings on the interpretation of these provisions. The
EC Treaty entrusts this important task to the European Court in
Luxembourg."3 The method used in order to attain this objec-
tive is the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 177.
The importance of this procedure is underlined by the fact
that some of the most important doctrines of European law were
developed in preliminary ruling judgments. I need only men-
tion the Van Gend en Loos 4 and the Costa v. ENEL 5 judgments,
both rendered in 1963, in which the Court laid the foundations
of Community law by holding that its provisions are capable of
direct effect in the legal order of the Member States and that
they take precedence over national law. It may be added that
references for a preliminary ruling sometimes give rise to partic-
ularly spectacular proceedings. You will have heard that some
weeks ago I was called upon to deliver my opinion in the Bos-
man 16 case. These proceedings concern the compatibility with
Community law of rules applied by the football associations in
the Community. In all my years at the Court, I have never come
across a case where the media and the public took such a keen
and vivid interest in the proceedings of the Court of Justice as
they did in this case.
Requests for a preliminary ruling also account for a consid-
erable part of the workload of the Court. Until the end of 1994,
more than 2900 requests for preliminary rulings had been
lodged at the Court.1 7 The number of these requests is ever in-
13. See id. art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689 (granting final jurisdiction over ques-
tions of European Community law to Court of Justice).
14. Algemene Transpoort en Expepeditie Ondereming Van Gend en Loos v. Ned-
erlandse Tariefcommissie, Case 26/62, [1963] E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105.
15. Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, [1964] C.M.L.R. 105.
16. Union Royale Beige des Socikts de Football Ass'n v. Bosman, Case C-415/93
(Eur. Ct. J. Dec. 15, 1995) (not yet reported).
17. This statistic and all statistics cited hereafter are internal statistics of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice.
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creasing. This becomes particularly evident if one looks at
longer periods. Between 1961 and 1970, the average number of
preliminary references was around eleven per year. Between
1971 and 1980, this figure increased to some seventy-three, and
to more than 130 for the period between 1981 and 1990. The
yearly average for the years from 1991 to 1994, inclusive, was
around 189. In 1993 and 1994 alone, 204 and 203 references,
respectively, were made to the Court ofJustice. In 1995, 196 ref-
erences have been made so far.
The enlargement of the Community on January 1, 1995 will
result in further increases. Experience with previous entries of
new Member States has shown that some time usually elapsed
before the courts of these Member States started to make refer-
ences to the European Court. The first reference from Den-
mark, for example, was made in 1975, that is to say two years
after Denmark's accession. The first reference from Portugal,
which had joined the Community in 1986, was not made until
1989. In the case of Greece, a Member State since 1981, we even
had to wait until 1986 before the Court of Justice was first asked
for a preliminary ruling. It is interesting to note that there is no
such "period of grace" - if I can call it that - as far as the
Member States which joined in 1995 are concerned. As early as
February of this year, a Swedish court submitted several requests
for a preliminary ruling and the first reference from Austria ar-
rived at the Court of Justice in September.
II. ARTICLE 177 AND THE COURTS OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM
How do the courts of the United Kingdom deal with Article
177 of the EC Treaty? This begs, of course, the more fundamen-
tal question as to how Community law is regarded in the United
Kingdom. The locus classicus in this regard is the judgment of
the Court of Appeal in Bulmer v Bollinger,8 where Lord Denning,
MR, gave his views on the subject. The passage is no doubt well-
known to all of you, but the poetry of Lord Denning's language
is such that it is well worth repeating. Lord Denning started by
saying that Community law did not interfere with matters which
solely concerned "the mainland of England and the people in
18. [1974] Ch. 401 (Eng. C.A.).
THE PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE
it."19 He then continued:
But when we come to matters with a European element, the
treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and
up the rivers. It cannot be held back. Parliament has de-
creed that the treaty is henceforward to be part of our law. It
is equal in force to any statute.20
It is of course hardly a coincidence that a judge of a seafar-
ing nation should choose a simile with a nautical flavor. The
expression he uses is delightful - it is not difficult to imagine a
flood of directives emanating from Brussels streaming up the
Thames. I may not be the best person to do full justice to these
words, living in a landlocked country as I do, but I cannot help
feeling that there might be a far deeper meaning to Lord Den-
ning's remarks than is immediately apparent. If one takes his
words literally, European law would only reach as far as the tide
in the United Kingdom - perhaps beyond Westminster, but cer-
tainly not as far as Windsor or even Oxford. It must also be
remembered that according to the immutable law of nature, the
tide will necessarily recede again, perhaps leaving some dis-
carded objects on the beaches and riversides on its way back to
the sea. It is possible, but not certain, that Lord Denning may
also have thought of the possibility that European law might ebb
away from the United Kingdom at some stage. There do indeed
appear to be periods of ebb and flow in European law as Lord
Denning's wise remarks imply.
In one respect, however, I think I have to correct the tradi-
tional view. Lord Denning's words have rightly become famous,
but I do not think that he was the first member of the British
judiciary to express his sentiments on European law. This dis-
tinction would appear to fall to a High Court judge, Justice
Owle, whose name is not as well-known today as it deserves to be.
In a famous case decided by himself and Justice Fish, he made
the following memorable comments on the subject:
The legal profession, or those at least who practise at the Bar,
will ever give thanks for the entry of the United Kingdom into
the European Economic Community. But those of us who sit
up here may well be driven from the Bench untimely, so
alien, odious, and unanswerable are some of the problems
19. Buimer, [1974] Ch. at 418.
20. Id.
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that the winds of Europe have blown upon our peaceful Brit-
ish shores.21
You will notice immediately that Justice Owle uses a meta-
phor here which is very similar to the one used by Lord Den-
ning. I assume that Lord Denning was familiar with this judg-
ment. The exasperation with European law, to which Justice
Owle gives vent in this passage, is perhaps understandable when
one considers the case before him. Two foreigners, a Signor
Garibaldi and a Miss Bardot, had presented themselves at by-
elections shortly after the United Kingdom had joined the Com-
munity. Both had been returned by their constituencies but the
Attorney-General had challenged their election on the ground
that no foreigner could be a member of the British parliament.
Notwithstanding the fact that he had mixed feelings about Euro-
pean law, Justice Owle set out to discuss Article 48 of the EC
Treaty,22 to which he had been referred by counsel. He held
that the expression "workers" used in this provision could be in-
terpreted as including members of parliament. Justice Owle
went on to conclude that the United Kingdom could not in this
case rely on the exception laid down in Article 48(4),2 since, in
his view, members of the House of Commons were not "em-
ployed in the public administration" within the meaning of that
provision.
You will of course know that the case I have just described is
not to be found in the Law Reports but in a book of that delight-
ful author of Misleading Cases, A.P. Herbert. Although it is
therefore fiction, I still think that it provides a useful and vivid
illustration of the problems which the arrival of European law
posed for the legal community in the United Kingdom. A coun-
try so deservedly proud of its rich legal traditions had to adjust to
a completely new legal system. One of the most fundamental
differences resided in the different approaches to the interpreta-
tion of statutes. Lord Denning already drew attention to this in
his judgment in Bulmer v Bollinger.24 He noted there that, as far
as European law was concerned, English judges were no longer
21. A.P. HERBERT, CLEAR FACTS - MUDDLED LAws 34 (1989).
22. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 48, [1992) 1 C.M.L.R. at 612. Article 48 sets forth
the rules regarding workers' freedom of movement within the European Union. Id.
23. Id. art. 48(4), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612. Article 48(4) provides that freedom
of movement does not apply to employment in the public service. Id.
24. Buimer, [1974) Ch. 401.
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allowed to "examine the words in meticulous detail" or to "argue
about the precise grammatical sense" but had to look rather "to
the purpose and intent" of the relevant provision and to take
account of other language versions.
It may safely be said that the judiciary and the other authori-
ties of the United Kingdom have demonstrated that they are up
to the task. European law is effectively applied throughout the
United Kingdom. A very good yardstick - if this expression may
still be used in metric Britain - in this respect is provided by the
number of actions brought against a Member State by the Com-
mission under Article 169 of the EC Treaty26 or by other Mem-
ber States under Article 17027 for failure to comply with obliga-
tions under the Treaty.2" Until the end of 1994, only forty-two
such proceedings had been commenced against the United
Kingdom. The figures for Germany and France are eighty-three
and 141, respectively. Even taking into account the fact that
these countries had been among the founding states of the Com-
munity, whereas the United Kingdom only joined in 1973, it is
clear that the record of the United Kingdom is rather impressive
and second only to Denmark's twenty-four actions. The other
extreme is Italy, with 333 actions during that period. It should
also be pointed out that these figures include those cases which
were later withdrawn by the plaintiff and those in which the ac-
tion was unsuccessful, that is to say those in which the Court did
not find that the Member State concerned had failed to fulfil its
obligations under Community law.
To take a closer look at the preliminary ruling procedure
itself, let us return for a moment to the case before Justice Owle.
In this case, the judge had been about to rule in favour of Mr.
Garibaldi and Ms. Bardot when his attention was drawn to Arti-
25. Id. at 426.
26. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686. Article 169 allows
the Commission to bring an action against a Member State to the Court ofJustice, but
requires that the Commission first deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter at issue
and allow the subject state an opportunity to submit observations. Id.
27. Id. art. 170, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686-87. Article 170 allows Member States to
bring an action against other Member States before the Court of Justice if the other
Member State fails to meet obligations under the EC Treaty or infringes on the rights of
the first Member State. Id.
28. The figures quoted include actions brought under the ECSC Treaty and the
Euratom Treaty.
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cle 177(3) of the EC Treaty.2 9 Mr. Justice Owle, albeit reluc-
tantly, came to the conclusion that in that particular case there
would be no appeal against his decision and that Article 177(3)
therefore applied. On this basis, he decided to refer the matter
to the European Court, not without grumbling about the final
decision that might be taken at some future date by "somebody
in Brussels."3"
It is certainly understandable that Justice Owle erroneously
thought that the European Court has its seat in Brussels - even
today some newspapers and commentators have trouble locating
the Court and regularly transfer it to Brussels, Strasbourg, or
even the Hague. What is more important is the readiness shown
by Justice Owle to accept the obligations which Article 177 puts
on national courts. In this he is representative of the attitude
taken by British courts. It is no secret that at least in two Mem-
ber States, Germany and France, supreme courts have on occa-
sions failed to comply with their obligation to refer questions on
Community law to the European Court. These cases have admit-
tedly been rare, but the fact nevertheless remains that courts of
last instance tried to avoid honoring the obligation to consult
the Court ofJustice that the Treaty puts on them.3 As far as the
United Kingdom is concerned, there would seem to be cases
where the House of Lords should have made a reference but did
not.3 2 On the whole, however, the highest courts in the United
Kingdom have faithfully and loyally cooperated with the Euro-
pean Court even when doing so required a radical departure
from long-established traditions. It will be sufficient to recall the
Factortame 13 case, where the House of Lords was led to take the
unprecedented step of granting an injunction against the Crown
and suspending UK legislation until the Court of Justice had
29. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 177(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689. This section
states that if a question is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and it comes
before a court of final instance in a Member State, that the court of final instance
should refer the matter to the Court ofJustice. Id.
30. See HERBERT, supra note 21.
31. See EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 177, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689 (stating that
.courts against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that
court shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice").
32. See, e.g., Kirklees v. Wickes, [1993] App. Cas. 227 (appeal taken from Eng.); ex
parte Freight Transport Association (H.L. Eng. 1991).
33. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex part Factortame Limited, [1990] 2
App. Cas. 85 (1989) (appeal taken from Eng.) (hereinafter Factortame 1).
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given its final ruling on the matter.34
More important still is the attitude adopted by the lower
courts. As I have already explained, these courts may make a
reference under Article 177, but are not obliged to do so.35
However, it goes without saying that the effectiveness of Euro-
pean law is undoubtedly greatly improved if these courts make
use of the possibilities afforded them by Article 177. In view of
the often very cumbersome and costly procedure involved in
pursuing an action through to the supreme courts of the rele-
vant Member State, if lower courts took the view that references
should only be made by higher courts, or even only by last in-
stance courts, it is likely that many issues would not reach the
Court of Justice.
In Bulmer v Bollinger,6 Lord Denning discussed the question
as to how lower courts should exercise their discretion to ask the
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 7 He also discussed the
preliminary question as to when a reference was necessary.38 As
to the latter, he made four points.
First, the question on European law had to be conclusive for
the case to be decided by the national court.39 This is obvious.
If the answer to the relevant question does not have any impact
on the result of the national proceedings, it is superfluous to
make a reference to Luxembourg.
Second, if the same or substantially the same question had
already been considered by the Court of Justice, the national
court could just simply follow the decision of the Court of Jus-
tice.4" However, Lord Denning correctly pointed out that the
European Court is not bound by its previous decisions.4 There
is no doctrine of stare decisis in European law.4" Nothing, there-
fore, prevents a national court from submitting the same ques-
tion to the European Court again if it thinks that the answer first
provided was unsatisfactory. Two current cases may suffice to
34. Factortame I, [1990] 2 App. Cas. at 152-53.
35. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing preliminary hearing pro-
cedure).
36. [1974] Ch. 401 (Eng. CA.).
37. Bulmer, [1974] Ch. at 423-25.
38. Id. at 422-23.
39. Id. at 422.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 420.
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illustrate this. In 1992, the Court ofJustice gave judgment in two
cases referred to it by German courts which concerned the areas
of social security and of equality between men and women re-
spectively. These judgments, known as the Paletta judgment"
and the Bdteljudgment, 44 turned out to be extremely unpopular
in Germany. There are now before the Court of Justice two ref-
erences for a preliminary ruling that, in essence, raise the same
issues as these previous cases and in which the Court is asked to
reconsider these judgments.45 In one case, Advocate General
Francis Jacobs invited the Court to modify its decision.'
The third and fourth comments of Lord Denning in this
context are more controversial. He points out that a reference
may not be necessary where a point is "reasonably clear and free
from doubt."47 This acte clair doctrine has proved to be very at-
tractive to courts of last instance that are unwilling to refer ques-
tions to Luxembourg. I recall a judgment of the second cham-
ber of the German Supreme Financial Court rendered in 1990.
One of the parties had argued that the relevant provision of Ger-
man tax law contravened Article 48 of the EC Treaty.48 In a
rather short judgment, the German court categorically stated
four or five times that it was absurd to think that Article 48 could
have anything to do with tax law.49 The question has since been
referred to the European Court which - as you will know -
ruled that Article 48 was indeed applicable." ° The Court of Jus-
tice has also made plain that the acte clair doctrine has a very
limited scope of application. In its C.LL.F.I.T judgment," ren-
dered in 1982, it pointed out that a ruling from the European
Court was only superfluous if the national judge - who had to
consider all the different language versions of the relevant provi-
sion and both its context and objective - came to the conclu-
43. Paletta v. Brennet, Case C-45/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-3423.
44. Arbeiterwohlfahrt der Stadt Berlin v. B6tel, Case C-360/90, [1992] E.C.R. I-
3589, [1992] 3 C.M.L.R. 446.45. Lewark, Case C-457/93 (Eur. Ct.J. Feb. 6, 1996) (not yet reported); Brennet v.
Paletta, Case C-206/94 (Eur. Ct. J.) (not yet decided).
46. Leark, Case C-457/93.
47. Bulmer, [1974] Ch. at 423.
48. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Article 48 of EC Treaty).
49. Judgment of October 31, 1990, BFH, Sammlung der Entscheidungen und Gut-
achten des Bundesfinanzhofs [BFHE] 162, at 374 (F.R.G.).
50. Finanzamt Koeln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, Case C-279/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-225.
51. SrL C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, Case 238/81, [1982] E.C.R. 3415, [1983]
1 C.M.L.R. 472.
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sion that neither for him, nor for courts in other Member States,
or for the European Court itself, could there be a serious doubt
as to the interpretation of the relevant provision.2 A tall order
indeed!
Last, Lord Denning took the view that a reference should
"in general" only be made once the facts of the case before the
national court had been established. 3 It is true that in many
cases it will not be possible to decide whether a particular point
of European law will be relevant before all the facts have been
ascertained. However, in other cases a reference to the Euro-
pean Court and the answer provided by that court may greatly
simplify national proceedings, for instance when it becomes
clear that some facts are irrelevant and do not, therefore, have to
be established. The courts of the United Kingdom have, there-
fore, quite rightly opted for a pragmatic approach. In a recently
decided case in which I was the Advocate General, The Queen v
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Evans Medical
Ltd.,5 4 the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court had re-
ferred questions on the compatibility of the British rules on the
importation of narcotic drugs with Community law at an early
stage of the proceedings. The national court stressed in its refer-
ence that it had not yet established all the facts since it was of the
opinion - correctly, as the judgment showed - that it might
not be necessary to ascertain all of them.
Let me now turn to Lord Denning's remarks on the exercise
of the national courts' discretion with regard to referrals. He
mentioned six points in this context of which four appear to me
to remain important. They concern the following headings: the
importance of not overwhelming the European Court of Justice,
the need to formulate the question clearly, the cost of the proce-
dure, and, lastly, the time it would take to get a ruling from the
European Court.5
The need to avoid overburdening the Court of Justice is
even more urgent today than it was twenty years ago when Lord
52. C.I.L.F.I.T., [1982] E.C.R. at 3430, 16-21, [1983] 1 C.M.L.R. at 491.
53. Bulmer, [1974] Ch. at 423.
54. Case C-324/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-563.
55. Bu/mer, [1974] Ch. at 423-425. The other two points, which will not be dis-
cussed here, were: (1) that a reference should only be made if the relevant point is
"really difficult and important;" and (2) that a national court should hesitate to refer a
question if both parties oppose the reference. Id. at 424-25.
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Denning expressed his views. In 1974, there were thirty-nine re-
quests for a preliminary ruling. In 1994, the number was more
than fivefold. Among these cases are quite a few that could ar-
guably be regarded as unnecessary. It is not unusual to find a
preliminary reference on a point that has already been clarified
by the Court ofJustice, but where the national court is not aware
of the case-law.
It is not at all easy for the Court ofJustice to dispose of these
cases in a speedy way. If it is fairly obvious that a previous judg-
ment of the Court of Justice, of which the national court is not
aware, could answer the questions submitted by that court, the
registrar of the Court of Justice sends a copy of this judgment to
the national judge and asks him or her whether, in the light of
this judgment, the request for a preliminary ruling is to be main-
tained. Where a preliminary question is "manifestly" identical
with a question that the Court of Justice has already answered,
the Court may also make a reasoned order in which it simply
refers to -its previous decision. 6 However, neither of these pos-
sibilities is used very often. The problem is aggravated by the
fact that in proceedings for a preliminary ruling an oral hearing
has to be held if any of the parties so requests." Even straight-
forward cases may, therefore, take up a lot of time and Court
resources.
What I have just said would not appear to be of. any rele-
vance to the courts of the United Kingdom. I am of course mak-
ing a subjective comment, but I think it can fairly be said that
references from British courts nearly always raise substantial
points concerning the interpretation of European law. As a rule,
British judges also appear to ascertain the case-law of the Court
ofJustice before making a reference and they set out clearly the
problem to which they need an answer.
This leads me to the second of Lord Denning's points to be
discussed here: the need to formulate the question clearly."
The European Court is only competent to rule on European law;
it has no jurisdiction to interpret national law or to decide on
factual issues. However, it is obvious that in most cases a mean-
56. See Rules of Procedure of the Court ofJustice, art. 104 § 3, 0J. L 176/7, at 27
(1991).
57. Id. art. 104 § 4, 0J. L 176/7, at 27 (1991).
58. See Bulmer, [1974] Ch. at 424 (advising that questions to European Court of
Justice be clearly formulated).
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ingful interpretation of Community law can only be given if the
Court knows exactly why the national court needs such, answer.
It is, therefore, very important that the reference of the national
court sets out the facts and the legal context of the national pro-
ceedings.
This necessity is now greater than ever. The Court ofJustice
has shown that it is willing to reformulate questions in order to
help the national court. The standard example is where a court
asks whether a particular law of Member State A is compatible
with European law. Since the European Court has no jurisdic-
tion under Article 177 to rule on national law, it can only pro-
vide an answer to the national court if the question is reformu-
lated so that it refers to European law alone. In many cases
where the reference was unclear or tersely worded, the Court
also made a considerable effort to try and establish the factual
and. legal background.
However, in recent years the attitude of the Court has be-
come less forthcoming. In a growing number of cases, requests
for preliminary rulings have been rejected on the ground that
the national judge had failed to provide the European Court
with the relevant information it needed in order to give a useful
interpretation of Community law.
It is remarkable that none of these cases concerned a refer-
ence from a British court. I do not think that this is mere coinci-
dence. If I were to describe the attitude of the Court of Justice
towards references from the United Kingdom, I would do best to
revert, once again, to Justice Owle and his tricky case concerning
Ms. Bardot. Upon discovering that he had to make a reference
to LuxembourgJustice Owle turned - with some emotion, one
may assume - to the Attorney-General who had brought the
point to his attention and asked him: "You mean that the Court
has been wasting its time?" The Attorney-General obligingly re-
plied: "No, my lord. The European Court, I am sure, will read
your judgment with interest and advantage."59 And this, I dare
say, is indeed the case. References from courts in the United
Kingdom are nearly always well-reasoned and they make good
reading, too. The transcript of the hearing in which the referral
was ordered, usually included in the bundle for the European
Court, is often particularly interesting.
59. HERBERT, supra note 21, at 42.
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Lord Denning also mentions that the national court should
consider the expense likely to be incurred by referring a case to
Luxembourg.6" However, this point would appear to be of less
importance. The European Court does not levy any charges for
its work in Article 177 cases, but reserves the decision as to costs
for the national court. There will inevitably be costs, for exam-
ple, for lawyers and for travelling to Luxembourg. The Euro-
pean Court does, however, dispose of some funds in order to
provide legal aid where necessary. Only a few months ago, for
example, the Court granted a substantial sum of money to a
plaintiff in a social security case referred to Luxembourg by a
British court in order to allow him to present his case.61 The
question of costs should, therefore, not be a decisive factor when
it comes to deciding whether or not to refer a case to the Euro-
pean Court.
Different considerations apply to the last of Lord Denning's
points which I want to discuss here: the matter of time.6" The
length of the preliminary ruling procedure is of course of funda-
mental importance when a national court considers the question
as to whether a reference should be made. The procedure
before the European Court represents, after all, only an interme-
diate stage in the litigation and the national court has to con-
tinue its proceedings after the Court in Luxembourg has given
its ruling. Lord Denning mentions in his judgment that the av-
erage length of time of Article 177 proceedings "at present
seems to be between six and nine months."6" Happy days, one is
tempted to comment now! At present, the average duration of
such proceedings is more than eighteen months.' A court not
obliged to refer preliminary questions to the Court of Justice
may think: this is too long. The Court ofJustice has tried - and
is still trying - to accelerate these proceedings, but so far there
has been only limited success. If the preliminary ruling proce-
dure is to continue to play its vital role, it is essential that na-
60. Bulmer, [1974] Ch. at 424-25.
61. O'Flynn, Case C-237/94 (Eur. Ct. J. ) (not yet decided).
62. Buimer, [1974] Ch. at 423-24.
63. Id.
64. The average was 20.4 months in 1993 and 18.0 months in 1994. The improve-
ment which these figures seem to suggest is probably due to special circumstances and
hardly of a lasting nature. See supra note 17.
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tional courts can expect a judgment from the European Court
within a reasonable period of time.
Let us now look at how - or whether - the courts of the
United Kingdom have followed Lord Denning's guidelines. One
of the important aspects of Lord Denning's approach was the
preference he expressed for referrals to be made by higher
courts rather than lower courts. If one looks at the numbers of
cases referred by individual courts, it becomes apparent that, in
this respect, Lord Denning has not been followed. For example,
when the House of Lords referred its first case to Luxembourg
in 1979, there had already been fourteen other references from
courts in the United Kingdom. The aggregate figures are unam-
biguous, too. Towards the end of October 1995,65 the Court of
Appeal had referred thirty cases whilst the House of Lords had
made seventeen referrals. By far the most important source of
references is, however, the High Court of Justice, with seventy-
nine references. In other words, more than thirty-four percent
of the referrals from courts in the United Kingdom emanate
from the High Court.
The attitude of High Court judges is perhaps best reflected
by the judgment of Justice Bingham - as he then was - in Cus-
toms and Excise Commissioners v. ApS Samex.6 6 The following re-
marks are particularly noteworthy:
Sitting as a judge in a national court, asked to decide ques-
tions of Community law, I am very conscious of the advan-
tages enjoyed by the European Court of Justice. It has a
panoramic view of the Community and its institutions, a de-
tailed knowledge of the treaties and of much subordinate leg-
islation made under them, and an intimate familiarity with
the functioning of the Community market which no national
judge denied the collective experience of the Court of Justice
could hope to achieve. Where questions of administrative in-
tention and practice arise the Court of Justice can receive
submissions from the Community institutions, as also where
relations between the Community and non-member states are
at issue. Where the interests of member states are affected
they can intervene to make their views known.
67
Whilst insisting that a court of first instance need not necessarily
65. Figures are as of October 20, 1995.
66. [1983] 1 All E.R. 1042.
67. ApS Samex, [1983] 1 All E.R. at 1055.
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make a reference to the European Court, Justice Bingham pro-
ceeded nevertheless to submit questions to the European Court
in that case.
It is hardly a coincidence that seventy-three out of the sev-
enty-nine references of the High Court were made by the
Queen's Bench Division and only six by the Chancery Division.
However, it should not be forgotten that the very first reference
from a court in the United Kingdom was made by the Chancery
Court: the Van Duyn case,68 which will be known to all of you.
All this bears out the remarks made by Lord Slynn of Had-
ley, formerly Advocate General and later Judge at the European
Court of Justice, at a seminar a few weeks ago. He pointed out
that the courts of the United Kingdom have fully accepted the
dialogue with and the role of the European Court. They have
been very willing to submit questions for a preliminary ruling
and have loyally complied with the judgments rendered in Lux-
embourg.
Let me now return to the statistical data.69 There is still
more information to be gleaned from these figures for refer-
ences. If one looks at the period up to the end of 1993, there is
a total of 162 references from United Kingdom courts. This is,
of course, a far cry from the 857 references from Germany and
the 462 referrals from France. It is, however, not too far from
the 319 references made by Italian courts. If one takes into ac-
count the fact that the United Kingdom onlyjoined the Commu-
nity in 1973, and if one also considers that the number of courts
is lower in the United Kingdom than in some of the other Mem-
ber States, the number of referrals is rather significant. This is
confirmed if one looks at the period between 1991 and 1993
alone: while German courts take first place with 173 references,
Italy accounts for eighty-two, France for sixty-six, and the United
Kingdom takes sixth place with forty-four referrals.
The figures for the United Kingdom over the years also con-
firm the general trend. Between 1974 - the year when the first
reference was made - and 1987, the number of referrals rose
gradually from one to nine a year. The average yearly number of
68. Van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1337, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R.
347.
69. See supra note 17 (stating that all statistics in Address come from internal statis-
tics of European Court of Justice).
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referrals between 1988 and 1993 was around fourteen. In 1994,
there were twenty-four references from courts in the United
Kingdom, and sixteen referrals have already been made in 1995.
Let us now look more particularly at the subject-matter of
the 162 cases referred by courts from the United Kingdom. If
one breaks down the referrals made so far, questions concerning
"social law" are most important with thirty-six cases. This cate-
gory is of course mainly made up of references in the area of
equality between women and men. The number of these cases is
not to be explained, as some cynics would have it, by the fact that
there is more discrimination in the United Kingdom than else-
where. Rather, it is evidence of the fact that this issue is perhaps
taken very seriously in the United Kingdom. Lord Slynn of Had-
ley has argued that the number of these cases proves that the
Equal Opportunities Commission and the relevant legislation
have worked satisfactorily. It has to be admitted, however, that
the issue of equality between the sexes has long preoccupied em-
inent persons in the Kingdom, even before this legislation came
into force. It will be remembered, for example, that Henry V
took exception to that notorious passage of the Lex Salica which
provides "ne mulieres succedant in terrain Salicam."70 A blatant
discrimination indeed! The king consulted the archbishops of
Canterbury and York on the subject. If the monarch had lived in
our age he might have referred the case to the European Court
in Luxembourg - although it is not certain whether the Euro-
pean Court could have found better arguments than the two
archbishops.
The second most important subject-matter of referrals is ag-
riculture with twenty-nine cases, to which may suitably be added
the twelve references on questions concerning fisheries. It is ob-
vious that the milk-quota regime of the Community has
presented judges in the United Kingdom with at least as many
questions of interpretation as courts in other Member States.
References which asked for an interpretation of Article 3071
(twenty-eight cases) and social security cases (twenty-one) come
next. Questions on tax law and on the free movement of work-
70. Translation: "Women shall not be allowed to inherit Salic land."
71. EC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 30, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 602. Article 30 prohibits
quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect. Id.
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ers gave rise to a fairly similar number of cases (sixteen and four-
teen cases respectively).
Mention should also be made of the references on
problems regarding the Brussels Convention.72 The number of
these references is not very big - so far there have been ten of
them. However, this area of the law is particularly well-suited to
demonstrate the interaction and cooperation between the Euro-
pean Court of Justice and the courts of the United Kingdom. I
will only mention one specific but highly important issue.
Under the Brussels Convention, an action in a given case may
quite often be brought in the courts of different Member States.
For example, the court where the defendant has his residence
and the courts which have jurisdiction under Article 5 will not
necessarily be in the same country.73 If more than one court is
seised, the risk of conflicting judgments arises. Articles 21 to 23
of the Convention deal with this problem. 4 I do not need to go
into details here. Suffice it to say that, generally speaking, the
Convention resolves the problem in favour of the court "first
seised."7' However, the Convention does not explain what this
means. In 1984, the European Court held that the "court first
seised" was the court "before which the requirements for pro-
ceedings to become definitively pending are first fulfilled."7 6 It
added that these requirements were to be determined "in ac-
cordance with the national law of each of the courts con-
cerned."
77
However, these national laws differ. In Germany, an action
is not normally regarded as pending before the document in
which the plaintiff sets out his claim has been served on the de-
fendant. A different approach prevailed in England. I shall be
carrying coals to Newcastle, but I think I have to mention that, in
actions starting with a writ, the originating document (the writ)
is issued by the courts. It is then up to the plaintiff to serve it on
the defendant. There was strong authority for the proposition
that an action was pending as soon as the writ had been issued.
72. Brussels Convention, supra note 6, O.J. L 304/77 (1978).
73. Id. art. 5, O.J. L 304/77, at 79 (1978).
74. Id. arts. 21-23, O.J. 304/77, at 83 (1978).
75. Id.
76. Zelger v Salinitri, Case 129/83, [1984] E.C.R. 2397, 2408 16, [1985] 3
C.M.L.R. 366, 379 16.
77. Zelger, [1984] E.C.R. at 2408 16, [1985] 3 C.M.L.R. at 379 16.
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Justice Hirst, for example, so held in Kloeckner & Co. AG v. Gatoil
Overseas Inc.78 From a historical point of view this is correct.
The expression lis pendens owes its origin to the fact that the writ
was hung in the court's filing cabinet. I assume that this tech-
nique was also applied by the Chancery which has given its name
to Chancery Lane where we are tonight.
This is of course a rather inconvenient solution as far as the
Brussels Convention is concerned. It is only necessary to recall
that there is no obligation on a plaintiff to serve the writ. He
may, therefore, wait until the very end of the period of validity of
the writ before serving it on the defendant. Assuming that the
relevant moment were the day when he filed his action at the
court, any other action brought by the defendant himself could,
therefore, easily be frustrated.
This unsatisfactory state of things was much deplored by
continental scholars. The solution came, not with ajudgment of
the European Court, but from within the United Kingdom. In
1992, the Court of Appeal held, in Dresser UK Ltd. and others v.
Falcongate Freight Management Ltd. and others,79 that, for the pur-
poses of the Brussels Convention, it was service of proceedings
and not issue of the writ which was decisive.8 ' The essential rea-
soning is to be found in the judgment of Lord Justice Bingham.
Lord Justice Bingham agreed with the view expressed by
counsel that English procedure should not be forced into "a
strait-jacket of European design.""' He continued, however, as
follows:
But procedural idiosyncrasy is not (like national costume or
regional cuisine) to be nurtured for its own sake and in an-
swering the question before us we must have regard to the
realities of litigation in this country and the purpose of the
convention, not to tradition, nomenclature or rules devel-
oped for other purposes.8 2
He continued to declare that, in his judgment, it was "artificial,
far-fetched and wrong" to hold that an action became pending
upon mere issue of proceedings.8 3 He allowed an exception,
78. [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 177, 204.
79. [1992] Q.B. 502 (Eng. CA).
80. Dresser, [1992] Q.B. at 523.
81. Id. at 522.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 523.
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however, in cases where the relevant court had actually exercised
jurisdiction before the writ had been served. 4 This approach
has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Neste Chemicals SA
v DK Line SA and another [The Sargasso].8 5 The courts of the
United Kingdom have thus made a valuable and important con-
tribution towards the proper functioning of the Brussels Con-
vention and of Community law in general.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to an important as-
pect of the procedure under Article 177, namely the possibility
for Member States and institutions of the Community to make
their views known.8 6 It goes without saying that the submissions
of Member States are very important for the Court. A ruling of
the Court may, for example, have repercussions on other sec-
tors, and it is often very difficult to ascertain these further conse-
quences without the assistance of Member States. Member
States are also in the best position to provide the Court with vital
factual and legal background information. Needless to say that
well-reasoned submissions can exercise a considerable influence
on the decision-making process. It is clear, therefore, that this is
a very important possibility for Member States to influence the
outcome of cases.
As the figures show, the United Kingdom makes good use of
this possibility. These figures are based on the judgments the
Court of Justice has rendered in Article 177 cases so far. They do
not, therefore, correspond to the figures for references I have
mentioned before.
Towards the end of October 1995, the Court of Justice had
rendered 2038 judgments in proceedings under Article 177 of
the Treaty. More than a third of these - 732 - were referrals
from Germany. Two hundred eighty-eight judgments were ren-
dered upon referrals from France. Referrals from Italian courts
so far have led to 211 judgments. Requests for a preliminary
ruling from the United Kingdom have resulted in 139judgments
so far. It is interesting to compare how often the Member States
concerned have intervened in these proceedings. The French
84. Id.
85. [1994] 3 All E.R. 180 (Eng. C.A.). In this judgment, the Court of Appeal gave
up the reservation made by Bingham, LJ, in Falcongate. Neste Chemicals, [1994] 3 All E.R.
at 181.
86. See, e.g., supra note 66-67 (setting forth comments by Justice Bingham in Cus-
toms and Excise Commissioners v. ApS Samex).
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Government has made submissions in 172 of the 288 cases re-
ferred by French courts. The Italian Government has intervened
in 159 of the 211 refernces from Italy. That is to say, these gov-
ernments took an active part in approximately sixty-one percent
and seventy-five percent, respectively, of the references emanat-
ing from courts in their territory. The German Government
made submissions in 231 of the 732 cases referred by German
courts - less than thirty-two percent of all referrals. The Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom, on the other hand, intervened
in 123 of the 139 cases coming from courts in the United King-
dom - that is to say, in nearly eighty-eight percent of these
cases. I think that these figures speak for themselves.
Even more impressive is the overall record. The Member
State that has lodged submissions in more cases than any other
country in the Community is the United Kingdom. The Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom has intervened in 407 cases so far.
Germany with 395, Italy with 383 and France with 342 cases fol-
low. This clearly shows that not only the courts of the United
Kingdom, but also its government, take a strong interest in Euro-
pean law.
CONCLUSION
By participating in the Article 177 procedure the United
Kingdom courts and the United Kingdom Government have
rendered a contribution highly appreciated by all participants to
the interpretation of Community law. The Community would be
much poorer without these contributions.
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